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[185] 
Invalidating Gene Patents: 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office 
Ashley McHugh* 
Biotechnology companies and research institutions have patented thousands of genes 
based on the idea that a gene in an isolated and purified form is a patentable invention. 
The biotechnology industry has since grown to a multibillion dollar industry using 
gene patents as a basis for targeting new drugs, researching genetic disease, and 
developing diagnostics. One company, Myriad Genetics, faces the threat of having their 
patents invalidated because of their monopolistic use of their patents on human breast 
cancer genes. In Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, the district court found Myriad’s gene patents invalid and unenforceable. If 
upheld, the decision will invalidate all patents on human genes and potentially many 
other patents on isolated and purified natural products, having far-reaching 
implications for health, science, and biotechnology. 
This Note questions the district court decision in Association for Molecular Pathology 
to grant the plaintiffs standing to sue Myriad and the United States Patent & 
Trademark Office and to invalidate gene patents under existing case law. Opponents of 
gene patents argue that genes are products of nature and are therefore not patentable 
subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act. However, circuit courts have consistently 
endorsed the principle that isolated and purified products of nature are still inventions 
and patentable subject matter in certain circumstances. Although the patentability of 
human genes under § 101 had not been addressed by courts until now, human genes 
have been upheld as patentable under other requirements of the Patent Act. Because 
invalidating gene patents will not likely remedy the monopolistic effects of gene patents, 
this Note reviews several legislative approaches that could serve as a more appropriate 
vehicle to address the harms that gene patents cause. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011; B.A., Human 
Biology, Stanford University, 2006. I would like to thank my advisor, Jeffrey Lefstin, Professor of Law, 
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Introduction 
In May 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit 
against Myriad Genetics, Inc. and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), seeking to invalidate Myriad’s patents on 
two human genes in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office.1 The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment, declaring Myriad’s patents invalid and thus essentially 
invalidating all existing gene patents.2 The decision reversed longstanding 
 
 1. 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 2. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *163 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
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practices of granting and upholding gene patents under USPTO policy 
and existing case law.3 The ACLU filed suit on behalf of four scientific 
associations, two women’s health groups, eight researchers and genetic 
counselors, and six breast or ovarian cancer patients.4 
The plaintiffs sought to invalidate Myriad’s claims related to the 
BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 (together referred to as BRCA 1/2) genes, whose 
mutated forms are associated with an increased risk for breast or ovarian 
cancer.5 There were fifteen claims-in-suit from seven patents covering the 
non-mutated and mutated isolated and purified forms of the BRCA 1/2 
genes.6 The claims also covered methods for detecting a mutation, by 
comparing a mutated BRCA 1/2 gene with a non-mutated gene, and for 
analyzing the gene sequences to determine whether the gene contains a 
mutation associated with a higher risk of cancer.7 The case is unique 
because of the nature and identity of the parties, the novelty of the 
claims against Myriad and the USPTO, and the impact any decision 
would have on the biotechnology industry. 
The impact that cancer, and breast cancer in particular, has had on 
society gave the case and its outcome particular importance. Myriad’s 
monopolistic use of its gene patents has had a detrimental impact on 
potential and existing cancer patients.8 Myriad’s exclusive right to the 
BRCA genes has also arguably stunted genetic and diagnostic research 
on the BRCA genes themselves.9 As patent holder of the isolated and 
purified BRCA 1/2 genes, Myriad created diagnostic tests for individuals 
to determine their genetic risk for cancer by detecting deleterious 
mutations in individuals’ BRCA genes.10 Myriad is the sole provider of 
the BRCA diagnostic test, because it is able to prevent other research 
institutions from offering BRCA diagnostic testing by enforcing its right 
to exclude others from using the BRCA genes under its patents.11 As the 
sole provider of BRCA diagnostic testing, Myriad has been able to 
arguably exploit patients by charging a high price for the test and to chill 
research through limited licensing practices.12 The plaintiffs argued that 
the practical effect is that patients and society bear too much of the costs 
of Myriad’s monopoly.13 
 
 3. John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Cancer Genes Cannot Be Patented, U.S. Judge Rules, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 30, 2010, at B1. 
 4. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 370–76. 
 5. Id. at 369. 
 6. Id. at 380. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *64–70. 
 9. Id. at *70–81. 
 10. Id. at *56–57. 
 11. See id. at *60–64, *73. 
 12. Id. at *64–81. 
 13. See id. at *64, *72–73, *76. 
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Any decision from the Federal Circuit, and perhaps the Supreme 
Court, on appeal will have widespread consequences for the 
biotechnology industry. Since the Human Genome Project mapped 
nearly 25,000 genes, biotechnology companies have been able to patent 
thousands of genes:14 Almost twenty percent of human genes are now 
patented in the United States.15 Human genes are useful for a number of 
purposes. They provide a basis for targeting new drugs, researching 
genetic disease, and developing more efficient drugs and diagnostics.16 
Genomic-based medicine also includes genetic testing, such as Myriad’s 
BRCA diagnostic test. Genetic testing can refer to predictive testing of 
individuals susceptible to a particular genetic risk associated with a 
genetic mutation, diagnostic testing of individuals who have symptoms of 
a particular disease, or genetic testing of individuals diagnosed with a 
particular disease to optimize drug therapy.17 Because development and 
regulatory costs associated with bringing drugs and diagnostics to market 
are extremely high, intellectual property rights are needed to encourage 
investments in biotechnology.18 Gene patents confer a time-limited 
monopoly, providing incentives for companies to invest substantial time 
and resources in biotechnology and genetics.19 If the decision is upheld 
and companies can no longer patent genes, there will be fewer incentives 
for companies to develop genetic technology. 
This Note examines the district court decision in Association for 
Molecular Pathology under the existing case law surrounding gene 
patents. Part I discusses how the courts and administrative patent 
agencies have incorporated genes into modern intellectual property 
doctrine. Part II explains the current effects that Myriad’s gene patents 
have on patients and researchers. Part III analyzes the district court’s 
decision to grant the plaintiffs standing and to invalidate gene patents 
under § 101 of the Patent Act.20 Part IV examines what impact the district 
court decision could have if the Federal Circuit upholds the decision. 
Finally, Part V suggests legislative approaches as a more practical 
solution than invalidating gene patents under common law. 
 
 14. David Koepsell, Who Owns You? The Corporate Gold Rush to Patent Your Genes 3–4 
(2009). 
 15. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 
Science, 239, 239 (2005). 
 16. Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 835, 837. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-on Biologics, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 363, 363–64 (2007). 
See generally, Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development 
Costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 151 (2003) (surveying ten pharmaceutical firms for sixty-eight randomly 
selected new drugs, and finding that the total capitalized costs for new drugs increases at an annual 
rate of 7.4%). 
 19. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and 
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 303, 304 (2002). 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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I.  The Patentability of Genes Under U.S. Patent Law 
A. Patenting DNA 
In humans, each cell contains a complete copy of the human 
genome in the cell nucleus in the form of chromosomes, which are 
comprised of long, twisting strands of DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid.21 
DNA is made of molecules called nucleotides that bind together with a 
complementary DNA strand creating a double helix.22 Contiguous 
segments of DNA that “code” for the creation of proteins form a single 
gene.23 By dictating the function of each cell, DNA affects how a person 
grows, develops, and reproduces.24 Genes define physical traits and are 
responsible for both the inheritance of those traits and the production of 
proteins.25 Each gene contains regions called exons, which code for the 
creation of proteins to express phenotypes in the human body.26 A gene 
also contains noncoding portions called introns, which are interspersed 
between the exons.27 Before the body’s molecular machinery can 
synthesize proteins by “reading” the gene, the introns must be spliced 
out.28 The processes of reading a gene and synthesizing proteins are 
called transcription and translation.29 During transcription, the DNA 
double helix splits into a single strand, and an mRNA (messenger 
ribonucleic acid) is created to complement the single strand of DNA.30 
RNA is also made of nucleotides, but differs slightly in structure and 
chemical composition.31 The introns of the complementary mRNA are 
spliced out, and the result is a molecular transcript ready to be “read” to 
create proteins.32 
Gene patent holders do not own genes as they exist in a human 
body; they own an exclusive right to make, use, sell, or offer to sell a 
laboratory-synthesized form of the gene.33 Researchers have been able to 
 
 21. Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do the Ends Justify the Means?, 7 Computer L. Rev. & 
Tech. J. 255, 256 (2003). 
 22. Lori B. Andrews et al., Genetics: Ethics, Law, and Policy 17 (2002). 
 23. Id. at 22. 
 24. John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature 
Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 85 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 301, 309 
(2003). 
 25. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *29–30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
 26. Andrews et al., supra note 22, at 22. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Conley & Makowski, supra note 24, at 311. 
 30. Id. at 312. 
 31. Id. at 311. 
 32. Id. at 312. 
 33. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006); Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 
2001). 
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patent a gene by cloning a DNA strand, or a cDNA, through an artificial 
process similar to transcription.34 This process of synthesizing cDNA is 
referred to as “isolating and purifying” the gene.35 In laboratories, 
researchers create a cDNA by using an enzyme that causes transcription 
to occur in reverse, synthesizing a strand of DNA from a mature 
mRNA.36 Because mRNA does not contain any introns, neither does the 
cDNA.37 The result is a strand of DNA that contains only coding portions 
of the gene.38 Thus, the synthesized cDNA differs structurally from 
naturally occurring DNA, which contains introns and other molecules. 
Though structurally different, cDNA, mRNA, and naturally occurring 
DNA all contain the same instructions for the creation of certain 
proteins. But scientists and researchers can use cDNA for purposes for 
which they cannot use naturally occurring DNA. The use of cDNA “has 
revolutionized the fields of molecular biology, biochemistry and 
genetics” by allowing researchers to use cDNA to control DNA 
expression to study the effect of a gene on a disease or to create protein-
based drugs on a large scale that had been difficult to obtain by 
purification.39 In many ways, cDNA is a great deal more useful to 
scientists and researchers than native DNA. 
B. Novelty, Obviousness, and the Purification Doctrine 
The purpose of U.S. patent law is “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts” by granting inventors time-limited exclusive 
rights to inventions as an incentive to invest in new research and 
technology.40 Patent law must balance this right with the negative effect a 
monopoly will have on scientific progress. In order to maintain this 
balance, Congress statutorily imposed four major patentability 
requirements: patentable subject matter, novelty, usefulness, and 
nonobviousness.41 
Patent law generally excludes laws of nature, mental processes, and 
abstract ideas from patent protection, reflecting the concern that 
granting such protection would hinder scientific progress by expanding 
 
 34. Conley & Makowski, supra note 24, at 314. 
 35. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
 36. Conley & Makowski, supra note 24, at 314. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Sherry F. Grissom et al., A Qualitative Assessment of Direct-Labeled cDNA Products Prior to 
Microarray Analysis, 6 BMC Genomics 36 (2005), http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-
2164-6-36.pdf; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 23 n.6, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 
4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
 40. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 41. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2006). 
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patent monopolies too far.42 The 1853 Supreme Court case O’Reilly v. 
Morse exemplifies this fundamental principle.43 In O’Reilly, the inventor 
of the telegraph tried to claim the use of electromagnetism for long-
distance communication.44 The Court invalidated the claim because 
“[t]he mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of nature, 
without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the subject of a 
patent.”45 About a century later, in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., the Court upheld this same principle to invalidate a patent 
claiming the mixture of naturally existing bacteria capable of inoculating 
the seeds of leguminous plants.46 The Court’s decision to invalidate the 
patent was based on the same reasoning as that of O’Reilly: 
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or 
the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all 
men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown 
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must 
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful 
end.47 
The fundamental principle that natural phenomena, laws of nature, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable inventions remains a constant tenet of 
U.S. patent law.48 As emerging technological fields such as biotechnology 
and genetics arose toward the end of the twentieth century, the line 
between phenomena of nature and actual invention began to fade. 
Past legal challenges to the validity of gene patents concerned the 
novelty and nonobviousness requirements for patentability.49 Prior to the 
Patent Act of 1952, courts often confused the requirements of novelty, 
nonobviousness, and patentable subject matter and their relation to each 
other.50 While novelty and utility were always requirements, the case law 
 
 42. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 43. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
 44. Id. at 64. 
 45. Id. at 132. 
 46. 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
 47. Id. at 130. 
 48. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *111 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
 50. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 360–61 (“The disjunction between historical 
precedent in the Supreme Court and CCPA, and the modern practice of most circuit courts in 
evaluating biotechnology patents, has created a simmering conflict over the proper interpretation of 
sections 101 through 103 in evaluating many biotechnology patent applications. . . . Indeed, the CCPA 
even criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Flook, claiming that the Court confused the 
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness with the patentable class issue in section 101 . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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prior to 1952 developed a concept of “invention” later codified as 
obviousness, although courts occasionally merged all three concepts 
under the umbrella of “invention.”51 Under the current Patent Act of 
1952, for an invention to be novel, it must significantly differ from any 
previous inventions or prior art.52 An invention is obvious if the invention 
as a whole would have been obvious at the time it was created to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art or relevant field of the invention.53 
A common argument against granting patents on human gene patents is 
that genes are products of nature and are, therefore, an unpatentable 
discovery.54 But long before scientists mapped the human genome, the 
legal system upheld patents claiming natural products through the 
purification doctrine. 
The purification doctrine holds that purified products of nature are 
novel when they differ significantly from their naturally occurring 
counterparts.55 The Supreme Court first addressed a patent claiming a 
purified product of nature in 1874, in American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre 
Disintegrating Co.56 The Court initially rejected the purification 
argument, holding that a patent for purified cellulose to create paper did 
not significantly differ in kind or in substance from the naturally 
occurring cellulose, and it was therefore void for lack of novelty.57 This 
requirement of a significant difference created room for later courts to 
uphold patents claiming purified products that had significantly better 
therapeutic and commercial effects than the impure product.58 Not all 
courts agreed on the validity of this newly founded distinction for 
therapeutically valuable purified products. A circuit split arose in the 
early twentieth century where the Third Circuit, the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals (CCPA), and the Board of Patent Appeals all 
rejected this principle and invalidated patents claiming purified products 
of nature.59 
 
 51. See id. at 365. 
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Philippe G. Ducor, Patenting the Recombinant Products of 
Biotechnology and Other Molecules 11 (1998). 
 53. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 54. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *2. 
 55. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 332–33. 
 56. 90 U.S. 566 (1874). 
 57. Id. at 593–96. 
 58. See Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 704–05 (7th Cir. 1910) 
(upholding the validity of a patent claiming purified acetyl salicylic acid, or “aspirin,” because purified 
aspirin had significantly greater therapeutic value than unpurified forms of aspirin); Parke-Davis & 
Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding a 
patent claiming purified adrenaline did not fail for lack of novelty, because it was more therapeutically 
effective than the prior art). 
 59. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 1928) (rejecting a patent 
claiming purified tungsten); In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 619 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (rejecting a patent claiming 
purified vitamin C); In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (rejecting a patent claiming purified 
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After the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, the Fourth Circuit in 
Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. upheld the validity of a 
patent claiming purified vitamin B-12 because of its therapeutic 
effectiveness and commercial value.60 Pointing to an absence of statutory 
direction in the 1952 Patent Act, the court noted, “There is nothing in 
the language of the Act which precludes the issuance of a patent upon a 
‘product of nature’ when it is a ‘new and useful composition of matter’ 
and there is compliance with the specified conditions for patentability.”61 
The court emphasized the idea that, to a certain extent, all products used 
to make inventions are from nature.62 New and useful inventions 
comprised of matter necessarily include natural products.63 Under the 
Fourth Circuit’s line of reasoning, one cannot draw a line between 
products of nature and man-made inventions.64 After the Merck decision, 
the Board of Patent Appeals and CCPA reversed themselves, and courts 
gradually accepted and upheld patents claiming purified natural 
products.65 
C. Modern Acceptance of Gene Patents 
In the past, gene patents were granted and upheld under the 
purification doctrine, and no one had challenged them as nonpatentable 
subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act until Association for 
Molecular Pathology. Patentable subject matter under § 101 includes 
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”66 Much of the past 
debate around the validity of gene patents had focused on the other 
requirements for patentability, especially novelty and nonobviousness, in 
the context of genes being naturally occurring products.67 The closest the 
Supreme Court has come to a decision about patentable subject matter 
under § 101 relating to gene patents was in 1980, when the Court ruled 
on the patentability of a genetically engineered living organism in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.68 
 
ultramarine dye); In re Ridgway, 76 F.2d 602, 603 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (rejecting a patent claiming the 
abrasive chemical, crystalline alpha alumina); Ex parte Reed, 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 34, 36 (Pat. Off. Bd. 
App. 1961), rev’d on reconsideration, 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 105 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961). 
 60. 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958). 
 61. Id. at 161. 
 62. Id. at 162. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 353. 
 65. Id. at 356. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Ex parte Reed, 135 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 36. 
 66. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 67. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 
927 F.2d 1200, 1205–09 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 68. 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
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In Chakrabarty, the Patent Office rejected Chakrabarty’s 
application for a patent claiming a genetically engineered bacterium 
because the definition of patentable under § 101 was not intended to 
cover living organisms.69 The Court held that the bacterium was 
patentable subject matter as a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” 
because it exhibited characteristics that did not exist in the original 
bacterium, even though the bacterium itself existed naturally.70 The 
Court distinguished the genetically engineered bacterium from Funk 
Bros., because there, the mixture of bacteria’s “use in combination does 
not improve in any way their natural functioning.”71 But in Chakrabarty, 
the bacterium had “markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and one having the potential for significant utility.”72 Chakrabarty 
confirmed that inventors can patent products of nature, but they must 
have markedly different characteristics from their naturally occurring 
counterparts. Since then, however, the Supreme Court has not ruled on 
the purification doctrine in light of the “markedly different 
characteristics” requirement delineated in Chakrabarty. 
In 1991, the Federal Circuit addressed the patentability of purified 
DNA in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.73 In Amgen, Amgen 
owned a patent covering isolated and purified DNA sequences coding 
for the production of human erythropoietin (EPO).74 This protein 
stimulates the production of red blood cells and is used in the treatment 
of anemias or other blood disorders.75 Amgen sued Chugai and Genetics 
Institute for direct infringement by producing recombinant human EPO 
through DNA technology.76 Chugai raised several affirmative defenses, 
including the invalidity of Amgen’s patent for lack of novelty.77 While the 
court was careful to note that “neither [party] invented EPO or the EPO 
gene,” it emphasized that “[t]he subject matter of [one of Amgen’s 
patent claims] was the novel purified and isolated sequence which codes 
for EPO . . . .”78 The Federal Circuit upheld the validity of Amgen’s 
patent claims on the DNA sequences, because the gene was isolated and 
purified and, therefore, novel.79 Since Amgen, courts have generally 
upheld isolated and purified genes as novel and nonobvious.80 
 
 69. Id. at 306. 
 70. Id. at 308–09, 318. 
 71. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
 72. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. 
 73. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 74. Id. at 1203–04 
 75. Id. at 1203. 
 76. Id. at 1204. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1206. 
 79. Id. at 1206, 1219. 
 80. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 408. 
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II.  Myriad’s BRCA Patents and Their Effect 
Prior USPTO policy of granting gene patents allowed Myriad to 
obtain patents claiming two important genes associated with breast and 
ovarian cancer: BRCA 1 and BRCA 2. Everyone carries the BRCA 1/2 
genes; however, individuals with a mutated BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 gene 
may have an increased risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.81 
Depending on the type of mutation and family history, individuals 
carrying a BRCA mutation have a forty to eighty-five percent chance of 
developing breast cancer and a sixteen to forty percent chance of 
developing ovarian cancer during their lifetimes.82 Roughly five to ten 
percent of women with breast and ovarian cancer are likely to have 
inherited a mutated BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 gene.83 Given the large role the 
BRCA genes can play in breast and ovarian cancer, Myriad’s patents are 
extremely important and valuable intellectual property. 
A. The History and Importance of BRCA 
Many parties recognized the value and importance of the BRCA 1/2 
genes almost immediately after they were discovered. In 1990, a team led 
by Mary-Claire King, a human geneticist on faculty at the University of 
California, Berkeley, recognized that a mutated form of BRCA 1 
increased the risk of developing breast cancer.84 Mark Skolnick, co-
founder of Myriad, sequenced BRCA 1 with help from researchers at 
Myriad and the University of Utah, the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), and McGill University.85 Shortly thereafter, it became 
apparent that another gene, BRCA 2, was also linked with increased risk 
of breast and ovarian cancer.86 Skolnick raced against a group of U.K. 
researchers to discover, sequence, and patent BRCA 2.87 Myriad filed for 
a patent claiming BRCA 2 in the U.S. while CRC Technology, a U.K. 
research institution, filed for a patent in the U.K.88 Around that same 
time, the National Institute of Health (NIH), Myriad, and another gene 
discovery company, OncorMed, Inc., all filed overlapping patents 
 
 81. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U. S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 378 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 82. Id. (breast cancer); Abram Katz, Breast Cancer Gene Test Disputed, New Haven Reg., Sept. 
30, 2007, http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2007/09/30/import/18868796.prt (ovarian cancer). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of 
Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 Health L.J. 123, 131 (2002). 
 85. Id. In 1991, Mark Skolnick, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Medical Informatics at 
the University of Utah, co-founded Myriad with Walter Gilbert, 1980 Nobel Laureate in Chemistry 
and Professor in the Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology at Harvard University, and Peter 
Meldrum, past President and CEO of a company called Agridyne. Id. at 129. 
 86. Id. at 132. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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claiming BRCA 1.89 The NIH withdrew its patent application once two of 
their researchers were named on Myriad’s BRCA 1 patent, and Myriad 
eventually purchased an exclusive license to OncorMed’s patents in a 
lawsuit settlement.90 By the end of the race, Myriad owned patent rights 
to both the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genes in the U.S.91 
Before 1996, Myriad had not yet asserted its exclusivity rights over 
the BRCA 1/2 genes. Other research institutions offered cheaper BRCA 
diagnostic testing.92 Some researchers were even given the test free of 
charge.93 These tests varied in methodology, the part of the gene being 
tested, and who could be tested based on population.94 In the late 1990s, 
Myriad offered various researchers a limited license agreement to 
perform the test only on patients of Ashkenazi Jewish descent.95 Because 
Myriad owned patents on the mutated and non-mutated BRCA genes, it 
was able to require all researchers to pay a royalty fee under a license 
agreement in order to conduct genetic tests, regardless of differences 
methodologies.96 The researchers declined the offer because it was too 
narrow a license to perform any meaningful BRCA 1/2 testing.97 Myriad 
subsequently issued cease-and-desist letters to the research institutions 
that were providing unlicensed genetic BRCA testing to female 
patients.98 The researchers could not continue to use their own separate 
diagnostic tests or to create new, improved diagnostic tests.99 
Myriad now owns patents claiming all forms of the isolated BRCA 
1/2 genes themselves, any mutations thereof, all methods comparing or 
analyzing the two BRCA sequences to see if a mutation exists or to 
screen for potential cancer therapeutics, and several other related 
claims.100 Myriad currently provides two genetic diagnostic tests to detect 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 132–33. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 135. 
 93. Id. at 134–35. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *61–62 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
 96. See id. at *61–63. 
 97. Id. at *62. 
 98. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 378–
79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 99. There is a common law research exception to patent infringement, but the defense is “very 
narrow and limited to actions performed ‘for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry.’ Further, use does not qualify for the experimental use defense when it is 
undertaken in the ‘guise of scientific inquiry’ but has ‘definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial 
commercial purposes.’” Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The exception 
would not apply to researchers who are working to develop diagnostic tests for BRCA, because any 
test created would have commercial value. 
 100. Complaint at 20–24, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
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the presence or absence of mutations in the BRCA 1/2 genes. The first 
test, the Comprehensive BRACAnalysis Test costs more than $3000 per 
test.101 The second test, the BRACAnalysis Rearrangement Test, searches 
for large genetic mutations not caught by the standard Comprehensive 
BRACAnalysis Test.102 The BRACAnalysis Rearrangement Test costs 
approximately $650, but Myriad conducts the test for women who meet 
certain criteria at no additional cost.103 
B. The Negative Effects of Myriad’s Patents 
Myriad’s patents have had a number of negative effects on both 
patients and on the scientific community. As the sole provider of full 
sequencing of the BRCA 1/2 genes, Myriad is able to charge over $3000 
per test.104 For some women, such as several of the plaintiffs, Myriad will 
not accept their insurance, so they need to pay the full amount to find 
out whether they have a genetic predisposition to cancer.105 Despite 
oncologists’ and genetic counselors’ recommendations, these women 
cannot be tested if they cannot afford the full price of the test.106 In 
addition, due to the nature of patenting a gene itself, there is no available 
workaround for researchers to develop improved diagnostic tests.107 This 
is because a genetic diagnostic test requires the exact patented gene 
segment, such as BRCA 1. There is no substitute for that gene, so “the 
[inability] to use the patent-protected gene would, by definition, result in 
an incomplete and clinically unacceptable test since all of those 
individuals with the disease who have a mutation in the patented gene 
would go undetected and undiagnosed.”108 Thus, researchers cannot even 
develop independent, alternative ways of testing for BRCA mutations. 
Alternative tests would help patients and researchers in many ways. 
They would spur competition, which would improve the quality of the 
tests and lower costs of diagnostic testing. Alternative tests also would 
allow patients diagnosed with a cancer-predisposing mutation to receive 
confirmatory testing before making major medical decisions about 
invasive preventative treatment, such as a mastectomy or oophorectomy.109 
 
 101. Id. at 27. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 28. 
 104. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *57 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
 105. Id. at *14–16. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Genetics, Health, & Soc’y, Gene Patents and Licensing 
Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests 15 (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS 
Report] (“Inventing around a technology involves making an invention that accomplishes the same 
thing as the original patented invention but that does not infringe the patented invention.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 44. 
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Confirmatory testing by alternative tests would control for false 
negatives generated from Myriad’s BRACAnalysis. While there are a 
few laboratories that conduct confirmatory BRCA 1/2 testing pursuant 
to patent license agreements with Myriad, testing “is limited to the 
confirmation of certain, specific positive test results; the remaining types 
of positive test results as well as all negative test results are excluded 
from such testing services.”110 A 2006 study in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association revealed that twelve percent of the 
participants from families with high risk breast cancer received negative 
results from Myriad’s test, but actually carried cancer-predisposing 
mutations in one of their genes tested.111 Those who receive a falsely 
negative result from Myriad’s test are led to believe they are not 
genetically at risk for breast cancer and would have little reason to 
pursue any preventative measures. Moreover, Myriad’s tests do not look 
for all known mutations correlated with breast and ovarian cancer, but 
because of its patent claiming the isolated BRCA sequences themselves, 
Myriad is able to bar other researchers from developing diagnostic tests 
that could identify further such mutations.112 As a result, Myriad’s BRCA 
patents have had a detrimental impact on patients and researchers by 
barring the development of alternative diagnostic tests for BRCA 
mutations. 
C. The Lawsuit Against Myriad 
The plaintiffs in the suit against Myriad sought a declaratory 
judgment that Myriad’s patent claims were invalid and/or unenforceable, 
and an injunction against defendants from taking actions to enforce the 
patents.113 The complaint challenged the validity of Myriad’s patents 
claiming the isolated mutated and non-mutated forms of BRCA 1 and 
BRCA 2, the method of analyzing an individual’s BRCA 1 gene to 
determine if an inherited mutation exists, and the method of comparing 
BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 sequences containing mutations with normal 
sequences to determine whether the difference indicates a predisposition 
to breast or ovarian cancer.114 The plaintiffs challenged Myriad’s patent 
claims as nonpatentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act and 
as unconstitutional under Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the United 
States Constitution, as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments.115 
 
 110. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *69. 
 111. See Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 in 
Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 JAMA 1379, 1386 (2006). 
 112. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 381 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 113. Complaint at 30, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
 114. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 380. 
 115. Id. at 369–70. 
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On March 29, 2010, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York granted the plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment and invalidated Myriad’s BRCA and related method 
patents under § 101 as nonpatentable subject matter, finding that the 
patented genes do not markedly differ from genes as they exist in 
nature.116 The court dismissed the constitutional claims under the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance.117  
Since the inception of recombinant DNA technology, thousands of 
isolated and purified genes have been patented.118 This decision, if 
upheld, will have a tremendous impact on the biotechnology sector by 
invalidating all existing gene patents and, potentially, other related or 
similar patents. 
III.  Invalidating Gene Patents 
While the case is “unique in the identity of the parties, the scope 
and significance of the issues presented, and the consequences of the 
remedy sought,” the decision to invalidate Myriad’s BRCA patents 
should not be upheld.119 In applying the “markedly different 
 
 116. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *145, *163 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
 117. Id. at *161–62 (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)) (“[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional 
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the 
latter.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court also granted the 
USPTO’s motion to dismiss for judgment on the pleadings because the only claims against the USPTO 
were constitutional claims. Id. at *163. 
 118. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 359. 
 119. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 370. This Note will address the district court 
opinion invalidating the gene patents alone and will not address the decision to invalidate Myriad’s 
method patents. The district court invalidated Myriad’s method patents in light of the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), and In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010). The Federal Circuit in Bilski articulated the “machine or transformation” test for patentability 
under § 101 for method patents. 545 F.3d at 954. According to the Federal Circuit decision in Bilski, a 
method is patentable under § 101 “if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it 
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.” Id. Prometheus involved the validity of 
patent claims for methods determining the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs by measuring metabolite 
levels in patients’ blood. 581 F.3d at 1339. In Prometheus, the Federal Circuit held that the claimed 
methods satisfied the “machine or transformation” test, because determining metabolite levels 
included the extraction of metabolites by using some form of manipulation, which was a 
transformative step central to the claimed method. Id. at 1347. The district court distinguished 
Prometheus in Association for Molecular Pathology, holding that Myriad’s methods of analyzing or 
comparing BRCA sequences to determine a genetic mutation were invalid because the methods of 
“comparing” and “analyzing” were directed only toward the abstract mental processes of comparing 
and analyzing gene sequences, which is not transformative in nature. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at 
*151–53. However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Bilski stated that the Federal Circuit’s 
“machine or transformation” test is not the exclusive test for defining processes under § 101. 130 S. Ct. 
at 3226. This important distinction may affect whether the district court decision to invalidate Myriad’s 
diagnostic method patents is upheld. 
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characteristics” test from Chakrabarty, the district court did not 
adequately reconcile invalidating the BRCA patents as nonpatentable 
subject matter under § 101 with the prior case law establishing and 
upholding the purification doctrine. Even if the district court decision to 
invalidate gene patents under § 101 is upheld, all the plaintiffs except 
those who actually received cease-and-desist letters lacked standing to 
sue Myriad. While the negative impact of gene patents on patients and 
the scientific community is real and important, the court should not relax 
the standing requirements to remedy the negative effects of Myriad’s 
patents. 
A. Constitutional Standing to Sue the USPTO 
Even though the district court resolved the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
claims in favor of the USPTO, that does not render moot the standing 
issue: none of the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against the 
USPTO in the first place. Under Article III, there must be a justiciable 
case or controversy for a plaintiff to have standing for the court to hear 
his or her case.120 To have standing, a plaintiff must satisfy the 
constitutional requirement by showing (1) actual or threatened injury as 
a result of the defendant’s actions, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to 
the defendant’s actions, and (3) that the plaintiff’s injury can be 
redressed by a favorable decision.121 In addition, the plaintiff must satisfy 
the prudential requirement by asserting his or her own legal interest, 
rather than a generalized grievance shared by a larger class.122 
The court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the constitutional 
requirement by showing that their injury resulted from the USPTO’s 
policy to grant patents claiming DNA.123 If it were not for the USPTO 
allowing Myriad to monopolize the BRCA 1/2 genes, researchers could 
provide BRCA diagnostic testing, and the patients would not be 
deprived of adequate and cost effective diagnostic tests. In addition, 
plaintiffs’ injuries could be remedied by a favorable decision from the 
court. Invalidating the patents would allow researchers to be free to 
research the gene, and other companies could provide diagnostic testing, 
which would lower the cost of being tested for patients. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs satisfied the constitutional requirement for standing. 
The plaintiffs, however, did not satisfy the prudential requirement, 
because their injuries constitute a generalized grievance shared by a large 
 
 120. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
 121. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 472 (1982). 
 122. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 
(1975). 
 123. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 385. 
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class of citizens. Every person has a BRCA gene,124 and the cost and 
availability of Myriad’s tests affects any person who wants to be tested. 
In addition, Myriad’s patents prevent anyone from conducting research 
on the BRCA genes, or from providing BRCA diagnostic testing. In 
support of this contention, the defendants cited Animal Legal Defense 
Fund v. Quigg, which involved a challenge to the issuance of a notice by 
the Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks that non-naturally occurring 
substances such as animals could be patented.125 The plaintiffs in that case 
claimed that the Commissioner violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA)126 by failing to comply with the requirements of the APA’s 
public notice provision.127 They also claimed he acted in excess of 
statutory authority under the Patent Act.128 The Federal Circuit dismissed 
the claim for lack of standing, because the plaintiffs asserted “no adverse 
effect on any individual’s rights to benefits under the patent statute. 
Rather, they assert[ed] that the general public has an interest in the 
statutory limitations to patentability.”129 Similarly, the plaintiffs in 
Association for Molecular Pathology asserted an interest shared by a 
larger class, as well as the entire scientific, research, and medical 
communities.130 Their shared interest was in remedying the monopolistic 
effect of Myriad’s patents by limiting research and medicine. Technically, 
any consumer, patient, or researcher who would like to test or be tested 
for a BRCA mutation would have the same interest. 
Although the district court distinguished Animal Legal Defense 
Fund, it failed to recognize the plaintiffs’ interests as widely shared. The 
court distinguished Animal Legal Defense Fund because the decision 
turned on a lack of a legally cognizable right under the specific provisions 
of the APA.131 Additionally, the claimed harm in Animal Legal Defense 
Fund was merely speculative, because a patent claiming an animal had 
not actually been granted.132 In contrast, the court stated that because 
Myriad actually owns existing patents claiming the BRCA 1/2 genes 
granted by the USPTO, the plaintiffs’ harm is not speculative as Myriad 
 
 124. Id. at 378. 
 125. Id. at 392 & n.20 (citing Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 126. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–06 (2006). 
 127. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 932 F.2d at 925–26. 
 128. Id. at 931. 
 129. Id. at 929. 
 130. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *7–16. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
 131. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384 n.11; see Animal Legal Def. Fund, 932 
F.2d at 931 (“Having reviewed all of appellants’ arguments, we are persuaded that the Commissioner’s 
Notice falls within the ‘interpretative’ exception to the section 553 public notice and comment procedures. 
Appellants thus have no standing to assert Count I of the Complaint by reason of ‘procedural 
harm.’”). 
 132. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384 n.11. 
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actively prevents breast cancer patients from obtaining diagnostic tests.133 
However, even if the plaintiffs’ harms are substantiated, their harms are 
still a generalized grievance shared by a larger class. Dicta in Animal 
Legal Defense Fund supported the decision to dismiss for lack of 
standing, even if an animal patent had been granted, giving rise to a 
cognizable harm: 
Moreover, we find nothing in the law which gives rise to a right in 
nonapplicants to object to the way in which patent applications of 
others are prosecuted. A third party has no right to intervene in the 
prosecution of a particular patent application to prevent issuance of an 
allegedly invalid patent.134 
 The district court in Association for Molecular Pathology justified 
the plaintiffs’ standing even though their harms were generalized 
grievances, based on the fact that the plaintiffs asserted constitutionality 
claims against Myriad’s patents.135 Nevertheless, asserting the harm as a 
constitutional violation should not counteract the prudential requirement 
for standing. The prudential standing requirement is a separate 
requirement in addition to that of a legally cognizable harm under 
constitutional standing doctrine.136 While the plaintiffs have experienced 
actual harm, the harm is still a generalized grievance shared by all 
researchers and patients in the scientific community who are interested 
in engaging in clinical analysis of the BRCA genes. 
Not only did the plaintiffs fail to meet the prudential requirement, 
existing legislation precludes standing by outlining a specific procedure 
for third parties to challenge the validity of a patent. In the context of 
standing, the Supreme Court has held that “when a statute provides a 
detailed mechanism for judicial consideration of particular issues at the 
behest of particular persons, judicial review of those issues at the behest 
of other persons may be found to be impliedly precluded.”137 Congress 
has already outlined a statutory procedure for third parties to challenge a 
patent issued by the USPTO in reexamination proceedings, and the 
statute does not specifically allow for a private cause of action for third 
parties.138 Once a patent is granted, the Patent Act allows for any third 
party, at any time, to request a reexamination of the patent from the 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 932 F.2d at 930 (citing Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc. v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, 882 F.2d 1570, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The creation of a right or remedy in a 
third party to challenge a result favorable to a patent owner after ex parte prosecution would be 
unprecedented, and we conclude that such a right cannot be inferred.”); Chi. Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. 
Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452, 458 n.13 (7th Cir. 1975); Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach. 
Corp., 121 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1941), aff’d, 316 U.S. 364 (1942); Godtfredsen v. Banner, 503 F. 
Supp. 642, 646 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 135. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384–85. 
 136. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985).  
 137. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984). 
 138. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314–15 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2007). 
McHugh_25 (S. Tosdal) (Do Not Delete) 11/23/2010 5:33 PM 
November 2010]    INVALIDATING GENE PATENTS 203 
USPTO, but “[t]he active participation of the ex parte reexamination 
requester ends with the reply . . . , and no further submissions on behalf 
of the reexamination requester will be acknowledged or considered.”139 
After reexamination proceedings, the third party requesters cannot seek 
judicial review because the Patent Act specifies that only patent 
applicants may do so.140 Thus, under existing legislation, request for 
reexamination is the only way a third party may challenge the validity of 
a patent after the USPTO grants the patent. Challenges by third parties 
to the validity of a patent are limited to a reexamination request or as a 
defense to an allegation of infringement. 
In Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, the 
Federal Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s holding that a statute 
outlining a detailed mechanism for review of an issue can preclude 
judicial review of that issue.141 The Federal Circuit dismissed a suit 
brought against the USPTO to compel the USPTO to reopen the 
reexamination for lack of standing, because Congress precluded judicial 
review of reexamination decisions by creating a “comprehensive 
statutory scheme” for reexamination.142 The court concluded that “a 
plaintiff cannot claim standing based on violation of an asserted personal 
statutorily-created procedural right when Congress intended to grant 
that plaintiff no such right.”143 The district court in Association for 
Molecular Pathology distinguished this case, because the plaintiffs could 
not file reexamination requests for the alleged constitutional violations, 
so “the Patent Act provide[d] no remedy” for them.144 The plaintiffs did 
not file a reexamination request because reexamination is limited to 
claims of invalidity based on prior art.145 Instead, the plaintiffs asserted 
unique claims based on constitutionality.146 Therefore, according to the 
court, the only avenue available to remedy their constitutional harms is 
by lawsuit. However, the holding in Syntex could be extended to the 
current case because Congress specifically outlined a reexamination 
framework for claims of invalidity based on the prior art. Congress could 
have allowed for reexamination by any third party for any reason, but 
declined to do so. Thus, it is possible that Congress wanted to avoid 
waves of reexamination proceedings and lawsuits brought by third 
parties against lawfully granted patents under USPTO policies. Outlining 
 
 139. 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 314–15. 
 140. See 35 U.S.C. § 305; Boeing Co. v. Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, 853 F.2d 878, 881 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988). 
 141. 882 F.2d 1570, 1573–74 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 142. Id. at 1573. 
 143. Id. (quoting Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167, 1170 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 144. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 384–
85 (S.D.N.Y 2009). 
 145. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 311. 
 146. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
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reexamination procedures for novelty and obviousness claims only could 
impliedly preclude third party standing to sue to invalidate a patent that 
has already been reviewed and approved by the USPTO. 
Finally, the precedential effects of allowing the plaintiffs to sue the 
USPTO as third parties seeking to invalidate a patent are an important 
consideration. Allowing the plaintiffs to file suit for allegedly 
unconstitutional policies potentially invites the feared and admonished 
“flood of litigants” to challenge USPTO decisions based on 
constitutional claims, rather than following the reexamination 
procedures outlined in the Patent Act. Setting this precedent would also 
encourage third parties who are unsuccessful in invalidating a patent 
through reexamination, and consequently precluded from obtaining 
judicial review, to then file suit claiming constitutional violations. Patents 
already undergo initial review and approval by the USPTO and are 
presumed valid.147 Allowing any third party to sue for a legally granted 
patent seriously undermines the purpose of the USPTO. 
B. Declaratory Judgment Standing to Sue Myriad and the 
University of Utah Research Foundation 
To sue for a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff must satisfy the 
Supreme Court’s “all circumstances” test. Generally, suits for declaratory 
judgment relating to patents are filed by potential infringers in 
anticipation of an infringement action.148 Potential infringers usually seek 
a declaratory judgment from the court stating that they do not infringe 
the patent or that the patent is invalid before the inventor can sue them 
for infringement.149 However, Association for Molecular Pathology was a 
unique action, where third party patients, referred to as non-researcher 
plaintiffs in the district court opinion, and researchers sought to 
invalidate the patent, rather than potential infringers.150 In applying the 
existing declaratory judgment requirements for standing, the district 
court should not have granted standing for the non-researcher plaintiffs. 
The appropriate standard to determine whether a court may hear a 
declaratory judgment action is the “all circumstances” test from 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.151 Under this test, the court must 
determine whether, under all the circumstances, “there is a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
 
 147. 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
 148. Jennifer Saionz, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases: The Federal Circuit's 
Response to MedImmune v. Genentech, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 161, 165 (2008). 
 149. Id. 
 150. 669 F. Supp. 2d at 392. 
 151. 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). 
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judgment.”152 Plaintiffs must demonstrate there was an actual controversy 
by showing (1) there were affirmative acts by the defendant to enforce 
the patent, and (2) that the plaintiffs had engaged in meaningful 
preparation to conduct the infringing activity.153 
The court in this case should not have granted the non-researcher 
plaintiffs standing to sue Myriad and the University of Utah Research 
Foundation.154 Myriad sent cease-and-desist letters to various researchers 
and organizations who were researching the BRCA 1/2 genes and/or 
were providing commercial diagnostic tests.155 Sending the letters was a 
sufficient affirmative act to enforce the patent in satisfaction of the first 
prong. In satisfaction of the second prong, all the plaintiffs stated they 
were “ready, willing, and able” to conduct infringing activity consisting of 
clinical research and practices using BRCA 1/2 genes.156 The plaintiffs 
can be divided into two groups: researcher plaintiffs and non-researcher 
plaintiffs. The researcher plaintiffs, consisting of researchers and science 
organizations ready to use BRCA 1/2 for diagnostic testing and research 
activities, satisfied the declaratory judgment standing requirements, 
because they could provide alternative testing services other than 
Myriad’s diagnostic tests to potential breast cancer patients. The district 
court erroneously held that the non-researcher plaintiffs (the breast 
cancer plaintiffs and women’s health groups) had standing because they 
were ready, able, and willing to use the diagnostic testing services that 
the researcher plaintiffs would offer.157 Although they do not have the 
potential to directly infringe Myriad’s patents, because they themselves 
would not be using the isolated and purified BRCA genes, the district 
court found them to be “potential contributory infringers,” because they 
were ready, able, and willing be tested by the researcher plaintiffs.158 
In the past, courts have held that potential indirect infringers had 
standing for a declaratory judgment without a showing of direct 
 
 152. Id. (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 153. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. 
 154. Id. at 392. 
 155. Id. at 387 n.13, 390; see Complaint at 19, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 
(No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
 156. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 371; Complaint at 3–13, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
 157. Complaint at 10–13, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); 
see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 391–92. 
 158. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 392; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) 
(“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a 
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or 
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, 
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such 
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, 
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”). 
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infringement, but only where the patentee directly notified the indirect 
infringer about enforcing its patents against the indirect infringer.159 
Indirect infringement can include induced infringement or contributory 
infringement.160 Both actions involve somehow aiding or causing another 
person to directly infringe the patent, but a person cannot be liable for 
indirect infringement without the occurrence of direct infringement.161 In 
Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., the Federal Circuit held that a 
manufacturer of a product used in drilling mud had standing to bring a 
declaratory judgment action against the assignees of drilling mud 
patents.162 The plaintiff, Fina Research (FRSA), could only be liable for 
indirect infringement, because its product could only satisfy one element 
of the multi-element patent claims.163 Baroid tried to argue that FRSA 
did not have standing, because direct infringement had not actually 
occurred; thus, FRSA could not have meaningfully prepared to infringe 
under the second prong of the test for declaratory judgment standing.164 
The Federal Circuit rejected Baroid’s contention, holding that a potential 
indirect infringer could bring an action for declaratory judgment even if 
no direct infringement had occurred.165 Similarly, the researcher plaintiffs 
in Association for Molecular Pathology were not required to have 
directly infringed Myriad’s BRCA patents in order to have standing to 
bring a declaratory judgment action. 
While Fina Research establishes that indirect infringers can have 
declaratory judgment standing, Fina Research is easily distinguishable 
from Association for Molecular Pathology. In Fina Research, the Federal 
Circuit recognized the difficulties in determining whether an actual 
controversy emanates from potential indirect infringement.166 The court 
confirmed, “whether a declaratory plaintiff’s ability and definite 
intention to undertake a potentially infringing activity constitutes 
 
 159. See Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1485–86 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Walker 
Process Equip., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 356 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1966); Unif. Prod. Code Council, Inc. v. 
Kaslow, 460 F. Supp. 900, 903–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Recently, the Supreme Court in MedImmune, 
abandoned the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension” test to sue for declaratory judgment, 
which the Federal Circuit applied in Fina Research, as too stringent. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). This decision renders all Federal Circuit opinions decided under the 
“reasonable apprehension” test questionable, but Fina Research, although decided under the 
“reasonable apprehension” test, is still dispositive of the holding that indirect infringers can have 
standing to sue for declaratory judgment. If the indirect infringers in Fina Research satisfied the 
Federal Circuit’s more stringent test, they would likely satisfy the more relaxed “all circumstances” 
test under MedImmune.  
 160. See 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
 161. Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 162. 141 F.3d at 1481–82, 1485–86. 
 163. Id. at 1481–82. 
 164. Id. at 1485. 
 165. Id. at 1485–86. 
 166. Id. at 1485. 
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sufficient ‘preparation’ is a question of degree to be resolved on a case-
by-case basis.”167 Although the non-researcher plaintiffs in Association 
for Molecular Pathology did not need to show direct infringement, the 
relationship between non-researcher plaintiffs and Myriad is less 
pronounced than the relationship between the parties in Fina Research. 
One major factor exemplifying this discrepancy is the nature of the 
patentee’s affirmative acts to enforce the patent in Fina Research. Baroid 
sent a letter directly to FRSA notifying the plaintiffs that introducing its 
product into U.S. markets would induce infringement, and that it 
intended to enforce its patents.168 Baroid directly notified FRSA that it 
could enforce its patents, putting the indirect infringers on notice of a 
potential infringement action to allow them to bring a suit for 
declaratory judgment.169 In the current case, Myriad’s actions to enforce 
its patents were only directed at specific researcher plaintiffs, and not in 
any way directed toward the non-researcher plaintiffs.170 The non-
researcher plaintiffs might not have even known of Myriad’s efforts to 
enforce its patents until litigation had been initiated. Therefore, without 
any notice from the patentee, the non-researcher plaintiffs had no reason 
to bring a declaratory judgment and should not have had standing. 
The Supreme Court decision in MedImmune could provide some 
support for the plaintiffs, but not enough. In MedImmune, the Supreme 
Court abandoned the Federal Circuit’s stringent standing requirement 
that the declaratory plaintiff have “reasonable apprehension” that he or 
she will face an infringement suit.171 Now, instead of the “reasonable 
apprehension of suit” test, courts only need to employ the less stringent 
“all circumstances” test.172 However, it is unclear whether the standard 
has been so relaxed that the declaratory party need not have known of 
the patentee’s efforts to enforce its patents at all. If the patentee has not 
made any effort to enforce its patent against a declaratory party, there 
seems to be no indication that the parties actually have adverse legal 
interests, or that there is sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment. Allowing the non-researcher 
plaintiffs to bring an action for declaratory judgment, in essence, allows 
any person “able and willing” to use the product of a potential infringer 
to sue a patentee at any time, so long as there is at least one instance 
where the patentee has attempted to enforce its patent rights against any 
 
 167. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 
846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 168. Id. at 1482. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370–
73 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 171. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127, 132 n.11 (2007). 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 151–53. 
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potential infringer. This expands the doctrine of standing for declaratory 
judgment far beyond its scope. The only parties who should have 
standing to bring a declaratory judgment action against Myriad for 
patent invalidity are those research institutions who received cease-and-
desist letters, or any direct action from Myriad enforcing its patent rights. 
Even though the researcher plaintiffs who received cease-and-desist 
letters from Myriad likely had standing to bring a declaratory judgment, 
the district court erred in finding that genes are not patentable subject 
matter. 
C. Gene Patents Under § 101 
The district court made two errors in invalidating Myriad’s gene 
patents for lack of § 101 patentable subject matter. First, the court 
misapplied Chakrabarty’s “markedly different characteristics” test by 
ignoring the therapeutic and commercial properties of purified DNA 
that distinguish it from native DNA. Second, the district court 
misconstrued the chemical nature of purified DNA to conclude that it 
does not significantly differ from native DNA. These errors are 
inconsistent with prior Federal Circuit decisions upholding the 
patentability of isolated and purified compounds. 
1. Therapeutic and Commercial Value and the “Markedly Different 
Characteristics” Test 
The district court misapplied the “markedly different 
characteristics” test from Chakrabarty to conclude that isolated and 
purified genes do not significantly differ from native DNA. For the § 101 
requirement, the proper analysis is to determine “(1) whether the 
claimed invention possesses utility; and (2) whether the claimed 
invention constitutes statutory subject matter, that is, whether it is a 
‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof.’”173 Under Chakrabarty, patentable 
subject matter includes products of nature, as long as the new product 
has “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one 
having the potential for significant utility.”174 
The district court relied heavily on the 1931 Supreme Court case, 
American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., which involved a patent claim 
on fresh citrus fruit whose skin has been treated with the mineral 
solution, borax, to prevent molding.175 The Court rejected the patent and 
stated: 
 
 173. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *107 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
 174. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
 175. 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931). 
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Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from 
the raw material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive 
form, quality, or property. . . . There is no change in the name, 
appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange 
fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.176 
Similarly, the district court in Association for Molecular Pathology 
emphasized “the overriding importance of DNA’s nucleotide sequence 
to both its natural biological function as well as the utility associated with 
DNA in its isolated form,” finding that there was not a significant 
difference between the natural and isolated DNA.177 Isolated and 
purified DNA and natural DNA still serve the same function: coding for 
proteins. Like the orange in American Fruit Growers, the isolated and 
purified DNA is functionally the same as native DNA, because the two 
products code for the same proteins. 
Myriad relied on Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis & 
Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co.178 to show that isolated and purified DNA was 
similar to other isolated chemicals that were found to be patent-
eligible.179 In Parke-Davis, the court considered the validity of a patent 
claiming purified adrenaline, a natural hormone found in animal 
glands.180 The prior art, powdered suprarenal glands, contained some 
desired therapeutic properties, but could not be safely administered in 
humans.181 Nevertheless, the court found that the purified adrenaline was 
novel because it could be administered to humans for therapeutic 
purposes.182 
The district court in Association for Molecular Pathology 
distinguished Parke-Davis on the grounds that the plaintiffs challenged 
Parke-Davis’s patent claiming the purified adrenaline for lack of novelty 
and not for lack of patentable subject matter.183 The district court cited 
subsequent cases establishing that novelty and obviousness 
considerations should not be taken into account in determining 
patentable subject matter, because they are “separate requirements,” 
and that the test for patentable subject matter is whether the invention 
contains “‘markedly different characteristics’ over products existing in 
nature.”184 While novelty and patentable subject matter now are separate 
 
 176. Id. at 11–12. 
 177. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *134–35. 
 178. 189 F. 95, 109 (S.D.N.Y 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
 179. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *121–23 (citing Parke-Davis, 
189 F. at 97). 
 180. Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 97. 
 181. Id. at 106. 
 182. See id. at 102. 
 183. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *123–24. 
 184. Id. at *125 (quoting Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1343 
(2009); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)); see also id. at *107 (“The Supreme Court 
subsequently affirmed this understanding of the § 101 analysis in Diehr, noting that while it had been 
McHugh_25 (S. Tosdal) (Do Not Delete) 11/23/2010 5:33 PM 
210 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:185 
requirements, courts did not distinguish between the requirements 
before 1952, which created inconsistent qualifications for the novelty and 
patentable subject matter requirements.185 Following the district court’s 
reasoning to its logical end, commercial and therapeutic properties are 
sufficient to satisfy the novelty requirement under Parke-Davis but are 
not markedly different characteristics sufficient to satisfy the patentable 
subject matter requirement. The court stated that this approach was 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s rejection of patents claiming 
commercially useful natural products in American Fruit Growers, Funk 
Bros., American Wood-Paper, and O’Reilly for lack of patentable subject 
matter.186 However, the court failed to address a major distinction 
between cases upholding patents claiming purified products of nature, 
such as Parke-Davis and Merck, and cases rejecting patents claiming 
purified products of nature, such as Funk Bros., American Fruit Growers, 
and O’Reilly. The products in the former set of cases differed from their 
natural counterparts in therapeutic value, while the products in the latter 
cases did not. 
While commercial value alone may be insufficient to constitute a 
markedly different characteristic, it is a relevant consideration. The 
circuit courts have held that when a product’s purification gives it 
significant commercial and therapeutic value, the purified product is 
patentable subject matter.187 Merck, decided after the enactment of the 
Patent Act of 1952, applied Judge Hand’s reasoning in Parke-Davis to 
patentable subject matter under § 101.188 The court upheld a patent 
claiming purified vitamin B-12 as patentable subject matter because of its 
increased therapeutic value.189 The court stated that a § 101 inquiry 
should be considered in two steps: 
(1) that a patent may not be granted upon an old product though it be 
derived from a new source by a new and patentable process, and 
(2) that every step in the purification of a product is not a patentable 
advance, except, perhaps, as to the process, if the new product differs 
from the old ‘merely in degree, and not in kind.’190 
Under the first step, no one had ever produced a comparable product to 
the purified B-12, because it had such advantageous characteristics over 
 
argued that ‘novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101,’ ‘[t]he question . . . of whether a 
particular invention is novel is wholly apart from whether . . . the invention falls into a category of 
statutory subject matter.’” (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189–90 (1981) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 185. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 186. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *113, *125–26. 
 187. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958); 
Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 115; Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 
1910). 
 188. Merck, 253 F.2d at 163. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 162. 
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other vitamin B products.191 Under the second step, the purified B-12 
differed in kind and not just in degree.192 The court stated that the new 
product was more than a “mere advance in degree of purity,” and it 
differed in kind, because “products of great therapeutic and commercial 
worth have been developed. The new products [were] not the same as 
the old, but new and useful compositions entitled to the protection of the 
patent.”193 This language suggests that the purified B-12 differed in kind 
from the old product because of its great therapeutic and commercial 
worth. 
The Seventh Circuit case, Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld 
Co., also supports the commercial and therapeutic value distinction. The 
court upheld a patent claiming purified aspirin as “a new article of 
manufacture” because the purified aspirin was therapeutically 
effective.194 Although the only difference between the two products was 
purification, the court emphasized that the purified aspirin was 
patentable because of its therapeutic use.195 Thus, therapeutic value is a 
characteristic that makes a purified product a novel invention capable of 
patent protection under the Seventh and Fourth Circuit’s reasoning. 
Similarly, isolated and purified cDNA are therapeutically and 
commercially significant. Like the naturally occurring adrenaline and 
vitamin B, genes as they exist in nature cannot be used in a medically 
meaningful way. Isolation and purification of the gene is a necessary step 
in order to utilize the gene to diagnose mutations in people to determine 
predisposed risk for genetic disease. In emphasizing the “markedly 
different characteristics” test from Chakrabarty, the court in Association 
for Molecular Pathology ignores this distinction made in prior cases 
reviewed under a patentable subject matter analysis. The district court’s 
analysis suggests that if Parke-Davis or Kuehmsted were decided under 
Chakrabarty’s “markedly different characteristics” test under § 101, they 
would be overturned because simply extracting a product of nature for 
improved therapeutic use is not a sufficient change to satisfy the 
patentable subject matter requirement. This application of the 
“markedly different characteristics” test would invalidate all purified 
products that are patentable, because of their increased therapeutic and 
commercial properties. This was most likely not the outcome intended by 
Chakrabarty when the Supreme Court stated, “in choosing such 
expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified 
by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the 
 
 191. Id. at 162–63. 
 192. Id. at 164. 
 193. Id. 
 194. 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1910). 
 195. Id. 
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patent laws would be given wide scope.”196 In ignoring the therapeutic 
value distinction made in prior case law, the district court misapplied the 
“markedly different characteristics” test. 
2. Isolated Genes and Natural DNA as Genetic Instructions Instead 
of Chemical Compounds 
The district court also incorrectly categorized DNA as information 
and not as a chemical compound in order to conclude that isolated and 
purified DNA is no different than native DNA and therefore not 
patentable subject matter. The district court found that DNA’s unique 
status as the “physical embodiment of information” remains the same for 
naturally occurring DNA and for isolated and purified DNA.197 Genes 
serve “as the physical embodiment of laws of nature—those that define 
the construction of the human body.”198 An isolated and purified gene 
still codes for proteins to define physical traits.199 Therefore, according to 
the court, steps to isolate and purify DNA do not render the patented 
gene markedly different, because both forms serve as instructions for the 
coding of proteins.200 
Myriad tried to argue that DNA was similar to all biological 
chemicals, in that all chemicals convey some sort of information in the 
body, but the court distinguished DNA from other chemical compounds, 
because chemical compounds embody information about their own 
molecular structure for their own biological function.201 DNA, on the 
other hand, directs the synthesis of other molecules.202 The district court 
reasoned that because both isolated and purified DNA and native DNA 
have the same coding properties and functions, their defining 
characteristic remains the same.203 In addition, the court emphasized that 
the physical coding sequences of cDNA are the same as those of spliced, 
mature mRNA.204 Therefore, because the basis for isolated and purified 
DNA’s utility stems from the same functional property contained in 
native DNA, the court found that isolated and purified genes do not 
markedly differ from native DNA.205 
The district court’s view of DNA is too narrow and directly 
contradicts the Federal Circuit’s classification of DNA. In upholding 
Amgen’s patent on an isolated and purified gene, the Federal Circuit 
 
 196. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 197. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *134–35 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010). 
 198. Id. at *134. 
 199. Id. at *143. 
 200. Id. at *134. 
 201. Id. at *131–32. 
 202. Id. at *133–34. 
 203. Id. at *138–39. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *134. 
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stated, “[a] gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one.”206 By 
classifying DNA as the embodiment of information and finding that 
purified DNA does not differ from native DNA because of their shared 
functional property of conveying genetic instruction, the district court 
essentially identified what constituted “important” or “essential” 
property of DNA, and decided that cDNA does not markedly differ from 
native DNA. However, cDNA has important uses for which native DNA 
is unsuitable. Those functions include diagnostic testing, using cDNA to 
study the effect of a gene on a disease for therapeutic purposes, or 
creating protein-based drugs on a large scale that were difficult to obtain 
by purification.207 Genetic instruction is not the only property of DNA 
and should not be the only factor to consider when applying the 
“markedly different characteristics” test. 
While the district court distinguished DNA from other chemical 
compounds by its “unique qualities as a physical embodiment of 
information,” the court does not clearly state how this difference renders 
cDNA not patentable, while other purified chemical compounds are 
patentable.208 If the issue is functionality of the compound itself, all 
patents on purified products would be invalidated under the district 
court’s reasoning. Like isolated DNA, purified adrenaline and vitamin B-
12 have the same chemical function as those existing in an impure form. 
Their use in purified form necessarily relies on similar chemical 
properties to the impure form. For example, adrenaline as it existed in 
the powdered gland form still contained blood-pressure-raising 
properties, which necessarily stemmed from adrenaline’s chemical 
composition.209 The pure form simply allowed it to be safely and 
effectively administered in humans.210 Vitamin B as it existed in cattle 
liver still could treat pernicious anemia.211 Purification of the vitamin 
simply yielded a more effective treatment.212 Similarly, isolated genes 
could be the same product in native DNA as they are in cDNA. 
However, isolating the gene and extracting it from human cells gives it 
significant therapeutic value. That genes contain the same functional 
properties as information carriers whether they are isolated or native 
should not be the only consideration in determining whether isolated 
genes contain markedly different characteristics from native genes. The 
district court reasoning thus suggests that purification in general is simply 
 
 206. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 207. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *42, *140–42. 
 208. Id. at *135. 
 209. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 109 (S.D.N.Y 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d 
Cir. 1912). 
 210. Id. at 115. 
 211. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 158 (4th Cir. 1958). 
 212. Id. at 164. 
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not an inventive step yielding patentable subject matter. This narrow 
view of purified products, including DNA, does not follow prior circuit 
court precedent, and therefore the district court decision should be 
overturned. 
IV.  Impact of Invalidating Gene Patents 
Invalidating gene patents not only may fail to remedy many of the 
harms suffered by patients as a result of Myriad’s monopoly on 
diagnostic tests, but doing so may also lead to the invalidation of other 
patents that were granted based on the purification doctrine. A major 
concern is that thousands of patents will be invalidated and millions of 
dollars lost if the Federal Circuit upholds the district court decision.213 
Depending on how the court frames the decision, these concerns may be 
well-founded if the plaintiffs prevail. Even if a court were to render most 
gene patents invalid, it is unlikely companies will lose the plethora of 
intellectual property rights and billions of dollars they are afraid of losing 
as a result of the pending litigation. Most gene patents, like Myriad’s, do 
not just claim the isolated and purified DNA sequence; they also claim 
diagnostic tests and methods for using or analyzing the sequence. If using 
genes for specific diagnostic or therapeutic purposes could still be 
patented, then companies could possibly still monopolize diagnostic tests 
with other patents effectively blocking use of the genes anyway.214 
Nevertheless, the district court’s opinion is quite broad and could 
potentially invalidate other types of patents. If upheld, the district court’s 
decision might not even remedy the problems the plaintiffs experienced, 
but it could have the unintended consequence of invalidating other types 
of patents. 
If the district court’s decision in Association for Molecular 
Pathology is upheld, it could potentially invalidate an entire set of first-
generation biotechnology patents. Although many of those patents are 
expiring or expired, the patents that are still in effect will be invalidated 
and future patents with similar bases will not be granted. Many of these 
first-generation biotechnology patents consist of claims covering 
naturally occurring, therapeutically useful molecules or an isolated DNA 
sequence that codes for the production of naturally occurring, 
therapeutically useful molecules. For example, Amgen’s patent, the 
subject of litigation in 1991, was a patent claiming the sequence coding 
for the production of erythropoietin (EPO), a hormone used as a 
therapeutic agent for blood disorders.215 A similar example would be 
Scripps’s patent covering purified Factor VIII:C, a naturally occurring 
 
 213. Koepsell, supra note 14, at 114; see Schwartz & Pollack, supra note 3. 
 214. See Koepsell, supra note 14, at 144. 
 215. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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protein that is essential for blood clotting.216 Applying Judge Sweet’s 
reasoning from Association for Molecular Pathology, both these patents 
and thousands of other similar patents would be invalid, because they 
claim molecules in their isolated form that are really no different from 
the naturally occurring molecules—except that isolating them allows 
them to be used in a therapeutically significant way. Such a result could 
detrimentally impact the biotechnology sector by removing incentives to 
purify and commercialize therapeutically useful, naturally occurring 
products. 
V.  Legislative Alternatives 
Invalidating gene patents might be too narrow a reaction to remedy 
the larger problems that harmed plaintiffs in Association for Molecular 
pathology. A meta-analysis of all available empirical evidence relating to 
the negative effects of gene patents indicates that the problems have less 
to do with patenting and more to do with the nature of 
commercialization in research and medicine in general.217 Even if gene 
patents themselves were invalid, pharmaceutical companies, universities, 
and clinical laboratories could still monopolize diagnostic tests through 
other patents on platform technologies or methods of use. Given the 
findings of the study, it seems unlikely that invalidating Myriad’s BRCA 
patents would resolve the major concern of limiting scientific progress. 
To invalidate gene patents in this case, the district court has incorrectly 
applied the requirements for patentable subject matter and has expanded 
the doctrine of standing by allowing third parties to bring a declaratory 
judgment action without direct notice of enforcement of the patents-in-
suit. Rather than bend legal doctrine to meet a socially justifiable end, a 
more plausible solution would be to urge Congress to create some sort of 
statutory exemption for research or patient medical services that would 
otherwise infringe gene patents. 
A. Statutory Exemptions Suggested by SACGHS 
In response to the current litigation, the Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) issued a revised 
report assessing the effects of gene patenting and licensing practices on 
patient and clinical access to genetic tests.218 The report draws on law and 
 
 216. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
 217. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting 
Controversies, 24 Nature Biotechnology 1091, 1093 (2006). 
 218. SACGHS Report, supra note 107, at ix. SACGHS advises the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services on medical, ethical, legal and social issues raised by technological developments in 
human genetics. Id. One of the specific issues that SACGHS was chartered to examine is “current 
patent policy and licensing practices [and] their impact on access to genetic technologies.” Id. 
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policy, policy studies, and existing legal frameworks, to conclude that 
obstacles in research development are the result of the decreasing 
capacity of laws to mitigate the problems plaintiffs cite.219 Accordingly, 
the Committee made six recommendations relating to fostering better 
research and licensing practices, two of which suggest narrow statutory 
exemptions for infringing gene patents. The first statutory change is an 
“exemption from liability for anyone who infringes a patent on a gene 
while making, using, ordering, offering for sale, or selling a genetic test 
for patient care purposes.”220 The second is an exemption for the use of 
patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research.221 
Under an exemption from infringement liability for patient care 
purposes, researchers could create and sell an existing diagnostic test that 
would otherwise be exclusively offered by the patent holder.222 This 
exemption proposes to improve the availability and quality of genetic 
tests by restoring basic free market conditions for genetic tests.223 There 
are several diseases where unencumbered use of a gene patent has 
allowed for greater, more cost-efficient access to genetic tests for 
patients. For example, patents related to hereditary nonpolyposis 
colorectal cancer have not been enforced, allowing at least fifteen 
different laboratories to develop genetic testing.224 Similar results have 
occurred with cystic fibrosis and Huntington’s disease, because 
exclusivity has not been enforced with those diseases.225 Rather than 
eliminate gene patents altogether, this exemption addresses patient 
access concerns by introducing competition to lower costs and increase 
the likelihood that patients will find a provider that accepts their 
insurance.226 Multiple providers would also lead to availability of 
confirmatory testing, which would improve the quality of testing patients 
receive.227 
However, this exemption might be too narrow. The exemption still 
allows for patents claiming methods of genetic analysis and platform 
technologies that could block the use of existing diagnostic tests. If other 
labs created and sold Myriad’s breast cancer diagnostic test, they may be 
exempt from infringement liability for infringing the gene patent, but 
they would still infringe any valid method patents and any potential 
platform technology patents. Thus, the exemption could have little to no 
practical effect on increasing patient access to genetic tests. 
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The second exemption aims to allow researchers to develop new 
genetic tests and therapeutics without being liable for infringement. This 
recommendation seeks to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts.228 Using patented genes for research purposes often does not satisfy 
the experimental research exemption, because there is usually, if not 
always, a commercial interest in such research and not merely “idle 
curiosity.”229 Rather than focus on the availability of current genetic tests, 
this exemption would allow researchers to use patent-protected genes to 
develop new prognosis and risk assessment methods that would provide 
patients with more effective testing and diagnostic services.230 
While more plausible than the first, this exemption could also be 
circumvented by a patent claiming an essential method for analyzing the 
gene. For example, Myriad could still exclude other laboratories from 
developing alternative diagnostic tests if there was no workaround to 
analyzing a BRCA gene for mutations to determine genetic risk for 
breast cancer. If companies can patent a broad method of analyzing the 
gene that is essential to developing any diagnostic test, this exception 
could also have no practical effect. 
B. Create an Exception Similar to Existing Legislation 
If an exception to gene patents alone is too narrow to allow 
researchers to feasibly practice diagnostic testing without infringing 
related patents, a broader exception for a more specific and limited 
purpose could be more appropriate. An exception similar to the current 
medical and surgical procedure exception under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) could 
be more effective.231 Enacted in 1996 in response to litigation surrounding 
the infringement of “a sutureless method of closing eye incisions 
following cataract surgery,”232 the exception states: 
  (c)(1)With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a 
medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) 
or (b) of this title, the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of 
this title shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a 
related health care entity with respect to such medical activity. . . . 
  . . . . 
  (A) [T]he term “medical activity” means the performance of a 
medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include . . . the 
practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.233 
 
 228. Id. at 95. 
 229. Id. at 59. 
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 231. Michele Westhoff, Gene Patents: Ethical Dilemmas and Possible Solutions, 20 Health L. 1, 9–
10 (2008). 
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 233. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006). 
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Section 287(c) was enacted “[b]ecause the ‘medical community had a 
longstanding tradition of freely sharing information about advancements 
in healthcare, and [because] the practice of building upon trial and error 
promoted rather than stifled medical and surgical methods.’”234 Although 
§ 287(c) specifically excludes biotechnology patents, concerns about how 
detrimental gene patents could be for patients were not realized and 
brought to the public’s attention until Association for Molecular 
Pathology. Concerns about gene patents limiting patient access to 
diagnostic tests are also similar to those that initiated the creation of an 
exception for medical and surgical procedures. Rather than create an 
exception for gene patents specifically, an amendment could be written 
similarly to § 287(c), where any infringement by a medical practitioner 
for purposes of genetic diagnosis would be exempt from liability.235 This 
type of legislation is a compromise between industry, research, and 
clinical medicine. It would allow companies to enforce their patents 
against researchers and scientists who would attempt to commercialize 
any tests using patented genes or methods, while granting more efficient, 
lower-cost patient access to diagnostic tests.236 
C. Model After Other Countries’ Laws 
Congress could enact legislation similar to that of other countries 
either by excluding diagnostic, therapeutic, or surgical methods from 
patentability, or by denying patentability to an invention on moral 
grounds. Both of these exceptions are listed as possible options for 
countries to adopt under the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) agreement, which outlines specific minimum standards for its 
member countries for the harmonization of international intellectual 
property laws.237 It seems unlikely that Congress would implement 
legislation excluding DNA or diagnostic methods from patentability on 
moral grounds, because in the U.S., there is generally no accepted 
exclusion from patentability based on morality.238 However, Congress 
could implement legislation similar to that of other countries that allow 
for the exclusion of diagnostic methods from patentability. For example, 
the U.K. and Germany exclude from patentability methods for treating 
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 238. Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United 
States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1623, 1651 (2001). 
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humans or animals by surgery or therapy, as well as diagnostic 
methods.239 However, this restriction does not apply to research tools and 
would therefore, not apply to the patented gene sequences themselves. 
On the other hand, other provisions in TRIPS might allow for a specific 
exclusion of gene sequences from patentability for diagnostic purposes. 
Article 30 of TRIPS allows for limited exceptions that do not 
unreasonably prejudice the interests of the patent holder.240 Under this 
exemption, France and Belgium permit the grant of a compulsory license 
over patents claiming diagnostic methods.241 Thus, it is possible that 
Congress could allow for a very narrow exclusion, or possibly a 
compulsory license, and still comply with international intellectual 
property agreements. Congress could model similar exceptions or grants 
of compulsory licenses after other countries that have already 
implemented such limitations. 
Conclusion 
Gene patenting has incited legal and ethical debate since its 
inception, but the debate has been exacerbated by Myriad’s limited 
licensing practices and high costs for diagnostic tests involving the BRCA 
1/2 genes. Although the plaintiffs’ harms are serious, the district court 
should not have erroneously granted standing to the plaintiffs and 
misapplied the “markedly different characteristics” test to address the 
harms resulting from Myriad’s monopolistic exercise of its BRCA patent 
rights. As a practical matter, granting standing to third-party consumers 
to sue for harms resulting from the commercialization of medical 
technologies would also invite many more parties to sue patent holders 
and the USPTO for exercising their patent rights. Moreover, in light of 
the fact that invalidating gene patents might not solve many of the 
patients’ harms, a legislative exception seems to be a more effective and 
practical solution. Rather than invalidating gene patents under the 
common law, Congress should adopt a legislative limitation or 
compulsory license to remedy the harms patenting human genes can 
cause. 
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